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LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENTS*
A SURVEY OF FOREIGN LEGISLATION
By FRANcis DEAKI
N this article I shall briefly review the methods employed by
some foreign countries in order to make it easier for the increas-
ing number of victims of automobile accidents to obtain compen-
sation. I shall also attempt to evaluate the results accomplished
in so far as I have been able to ascertain what they are, in relation
to the objective sought to be attained.
The United States, which from the outset assumed leadership
in the automobile industry, felt perhaps earlier and with greater
intensity than any other country the impact of the legal and social
problems which arose with the appearance of this novel and dan-
gerous instrument of locomotion. As early as 1919, Professor
Carman pointed out the unsatisfactory state of affairs, in an article
published in this REviEw.1 His summary of the evils is as accurate
today as it was almost twenty years ago: the vast number of
litigations which clog court calendars; the wasteful expenses in-
*The author wishes to express his sincere appreciation to Dr. Erik
Kjelstrom and A. W. D. Gronningsater, Esq., (LL.B., '36, Columbia Uni-
versity) through whose kindness valuable information was obtained con-
cerning the Swedish and Norwegian legislation respectively, and to A. S.
Keller, Esq., for assistance in translating some of the Scandinavian texts.
The author is also deeply indebted to his colleague, Professor Jerome
Michael, for many valuable suggestions for the improvement of this study.
tJ. D., 1925, University of Budapest; S. J. D., 1927, Harvard Univer-
sity. Assistant Professor of Law, Colimbia University School of Law.
Adviser on foreign laws to the Committee to Study Compensation for Auto-
mobile Accidents. Member of Committee of Experts appointed by the
League of Nations Institute at Rome for the Unification of Private Law.
Author of The Hungarian-Rumanian Land Dispute (1928), and of numer-
ous articles on international law and comparative law in American and
foreign periodicals; co-author with Philip C. Jessup of Neutrality: Its His-
tory, Economics and Law, Vol. I, (1935).
'Carman, Is a Motor Vehicle Compensation Act Advisable? (1919) 4
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curred by both the litigants in the course of these litigations; the
difficulty and often the impossibility of proving negligence; the
effect of contributory negligence, however slight; and last but not
least, the frequency with which, after lengthy and expensive
litigation, the victim is faced with a judgment-proof defendant.
What has been done in this country to remedy these admitted
social evils? The question how best to distribute the losses result-
ing from automobile accidents has recently been subjected to a
searching examination by a committee working under the auspices
of the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social
Sciences. This investigation, which resulted in a wealth of infor-
mation,2 focussed attention on the problem, and stimulated pene-
trating discussion in interested circles.3 From the practical point of
view, however, comparatively little has been accomplished in bring-
ing our laws more in harmony with the exigencies of modern
conditions. True, the State of Massachusetts has taken the bold
step of introducing universal compulsory insurance against lia-
bility for damage caused by the use of automobiles.4 The Massa-
chusetts statute, however, solves only one aspect of the problem,
namely, the guaranty of a solvent judgment-debtor; the unfor-
tunate victim must still face the hazards of a common law action
for negligence. Even less effective are the so-called financial
responsibility laws enacted by some eighteen states of the Union.'
They insure the horse after the stable has burned down. The
requirement imposed in most of our States on public service
vehicles to insure against liability must also be regarded as a
partial remedy only, since private cars vastly outnumber buses
and taxis.
2Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Ac-
cidents (1932). Reviewed by Professor Ralph H. Dwan in (1933) 17 MIN-
NESOTA LAW REVIEW 235.
3See Symposium on the Report by Dean Young B. Smith, Professor
Noel T. Dowling of Columbia Law School and Mr. Austin J. .Lilly in
(1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 785. See also French, The Automobile Compensa-
tion Plan (1933) ; reviewed by Professor Dwan in (1934) 18 MINNESOTA
LAW REmvaw 896.
4Massachusetts, Acts 1925, ch. 346; amended, Acts 1926, ch. 368. For a
detailed analysis of the Massachusetts statute see Blanchard, Compulsory
Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance in Massachusetts, (1936) 3 Law and
Contemporary Problems 537.
5These statutes require, in substance, proof of financial responsibility
following the non-payment of a judgment or following conviction for the
violation of certain traffic rules. For an excellent analysis of such statutes
see Braun, The Financial Responsibility Law, (1936) 3 Law and Con-
temporary Problems 505. See also the Report cited supra note 2, ch. VI,
p. 97.
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To present another aspect of the problem, we should take cog-
nizance of the various steps taken by federal, state and municipal
authorities to reduce the number of accidents. These consist of
the strict supervision (in some states at least) of drivers' qualifi-
cations; of issuing detailed traffic rules; of installing traffic control
and safety devices; of building better roads; and of intensive
educational campaigns. The automobile industry has participated
indirectly in these efforts by steadily improving the mechanism of
cars. But, apart from these isolated and not always effective
indirect measures, no attempt has been made in this country to
face the problem frankly and to deal with it on a broad and com-
prehensive basis.
The same indictment can be levelled against the majority of
civilized nations, all of which have been confronted with the same
issue. Most of these foreign countries, like the states of our
Union, have taken legislative or administrative measures of one
kind or another, designed to reduce the number of accidents.
They have also sought to facilitate the recovery of damages by the
victim, by treating violations of traffic regulations as prima facie
evidence of negligence, or by changing their procedural law so as
to permit the victim to sue at the place of the accident instead of
requiring him to sue at the defendant's domicile. Also, in many
foreign countries, public service vehicles are subject to the obliga-
tion to insure against damages caused by their operation. This
article is not, however, concerned with partial reforms of these
kinds. Our interest at present is focussed on those foreign coun-
tries which have enacted comprehensive legislation aiming to deal
effectively with one or both of the two fundamental issues involved,
namely, the legal liability and the financial responsibility of the
owners or users of motor vehicles for damages caused by the opera-
tion thereof.
Legislation of this sort is at present in force in Austria, Ger-
many. Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, New Zealand, Great
Britain, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia. The statutes of these
ten countries fall into three categories:
(1) Legislation imposing a strict liability (i.e. liability irrespec-
tive of fault or negligence) for damage resulting from automobile
accidents, without in any way providing for the solvency of the
judgment debtor. In this category belongs the German statute of
1909.0
cStatute of May 3, 1909, (Gesetz fiber den Verkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen)
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(2) Legislation providing for compulsory insurance to guaran-
tee a solvent judgment-debtor without in any way altering the
basis of liability which continues to be predicated upon the affirm-
ative proof of negligence. In this category belong the New
Zealand Act of 19287 and the British Road Traffic Acts of 1930
and 1934.8
(3) Legislation imposing a strict liability and providing also
for the judgment-debtor's solvency by compulsory insurance. In
this category belong the statutes of Austria, 9, Norway, 10 Sweden,"'
Finland, 2 Denmark, 13 Switzerland 4 and Czechoslovakia. 15 It may
be noted that in some of the countries in the third category,-
namely, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Sweden-the imposition of
strict liability preceded by several years the requirement of com-
pulsory insurance.' 6 The only country which, prior to 1920, pro-
Reichsgesetzblatt 1909, 473; amended by the Acts of July 21, 1923, ibid.,
1923, Pt. I, 743, and of December 12, 1933, ibid., 1933, Pt. I, 1058.7Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act 1928, 19 Geo.
V (N.Z.) No. 52. See also the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party
Risks) Regulations 1929 (Order in Council of March 18, 1929) New Zealand
Gazette 1929, 763; Regulation 1934 (Order in Council of April 14, 1934)
ibid. 1934, 1136.8Road Traffic Act 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. V, c. 43; Road Traffic Act 1934,
24 & 25 Geo. V, c. 50. See also Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers)
Act 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. V, ch. 25. It may be noted that the same method
was adopted in the Massachusetts Act of 1925, supra note 4.
9Statute of August 9, 1908 (Gesetz fiber die Haftung ffir Schfden aus
dem Betriebe von Kraftfahrzeugen) Reichsgesetzblatt 1908, 581, No. 162;
statute of December 20, 1929 (Bundesgesetz fiber das Kraftfahrwesen)
Bundesgesetzblatt 1929, 1791, No. 437, and Executive Order of May 12,
1930 (Kraftfahrverordnung) ibid., 1930, 647, No. 138.
"oStatute of" June 21, 1912 (Lov om Bruk av Motorvogner), Norsk
Lovtidende (2 den avd.) 1912, 232; statute of February 20, 1926 (Lov om
Motorvogner), ibid., 1926, 66 and Executive Order of December 20, 1926.
"Statute No. 312 of June 30, 1916 (Lag ang. Ansvarighet F5r Skada
I F6ljd av Automobiltrafik) Svensk F6rfattningssamling 1916, 843;
statute No. 77 of May 10, 1929 (Lag om Trafikf6rsikring A Motorfordon)
ibid., 1929, 133.
12Statute of April 28, 1925 (Laki Moottoriajoneuvoliikenteesta Johtuvan
Vahigon Vastuusta) Suomen Asetuskokoelma 1925, 527, No. 148, and Execu-
tive Order of May 5, 1929, ibid., 531, No. 149.
"3Statute No. 144 of July 1, 1927, (Lov om MotorkoSretojer) Lovtidende
for Kongeriget Danmark 1927, 657; amended by statute No. 131 of April 14,
1932, ibid., 1932, 917.
14Statute of March 15, 1932 (Bundesgesetz fiber den Motorfahrzeug-und
Fahrradverkehr), 48 (N.F.) Eidgen6ssische Gesetzsammlung, 513, No. 41.
"5Statute No. 81 of March 26, 1935 (Gesetz fiber den Verkehr von
Kraftfahrzeugen), Sammlung der Gesetze und Verordnungen des Cecho-
slovakischen Staates 1935, 217; and Executive Order No. 203 of October
19, 1935, ibid. 580.
'6In Austria, strict liability was imposed by the 1908 statute, while in-
surance was introduced by the 1929 statute only. Supra note 9. The 1908
statute was of course in force in those parts of present-day Czechoslovakia
which were Austrian territory until the end of the World War. It re-
mained in force after Czechoslovakia became an independent nation in 1918,
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vided for both strict liability and the tort-feasor's solvency, was
Norway.
1 7
It is obvious that legislation of either the first or of the second
sort affords the victim only partial protection.
The imposition of strict liability without a guaranty of sol-
vency merely relieves the victim of the burden of proving negli-
gence. To this extent his position is improved, and this improve-
ment is not to be lightly dismissed as unimportant. In view of
the rapidity with which automobile accidents occur, it is indeed
unreasonable to demand that the victim establish the driver's
negligence as a condition of recovery. The victim or a bystander
generally cannot know and does not know the particular negligent
act or omission causing the accident. On the other hand, it must
be equally obvious that to make it easy for the victim to obtain
a judgment remains an empty gesture so long as there is no
assurance that his judgment will be paid. It should be pointed out
that at the time when this type of legislation was enacted in
Austria, Germany, Norway and Sweden, circumstances were such
that the imposition of absolute liability was of greater importance
to the victims of an automobile accident than securing the solvency
of the judgment-debtors would have been. Prior to the 1920's,
automobiles were, in European countries at least, decidedly a
luxury. Only a person with considerable means could afford to
own one; therefore, the likelihood that a victim would be faced
with a judgment-proof defendant was very slight indeed.' 8 The de
minimis maxim is perfect justification for the absence of pre-war
legislation in this respect. But today, and for some years past,
that justification no longer exists. The ownership of automobiles
(to say nothing about motorcycles) is no longer restricted to the
wealthy, even though their use is not so universal and widespread
in Europe as in the United States. It has therefore become much
more probable that the owner of a car which has injured some
person or property will be unable to satisfy a judgment against
him or will be able to do so only at the cost of his own ruin.
Hence, the utility of legislation which does no more than impose
until it was replaced by the Czechoslovak statute of 1935. Supra, note 15.
In Sweden, strict liability was imposed by the 1916 statute, but the in-
surance requirement was added only by the 1929 statute. Supra note 11.
17Under sec. 9 of the 1912 statute, supra note 10, owners of auto-
mobiles were required to deposit a security of 1000 Norwegian crowns.18The Norwegian statute of 1912, supra, note 10 requiring from auto-
mobile owners the deposit of a security in the slender sum of 1000 Nor-
wegian crowns is illustrative of this point of view.
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strict liability has diminished in proportion to the increasing num-
ber of persons of modest means who own or operate automobiles.
The correctness of this reasoning is best proved by the fact that
three of the countries which at the outset were satisfied with
legislation imposing strict liability-namely, Austria, Sweden and
Czechoslovakia-have found it desirable to complete their legisla-
tion by requiring compulsory insurance.
Somewhat similar reasoning can be applied to legislation con-
cerned with the solvency of automobile owners without imposing
a strict liability. It is true that such legislation relieves the victim
of the fear that he will obtain an unsatisfied judgment in lieu of
cash. But he has to travel a long and painful road before he can
collect his damages. It is noteworthy that this type of legislation
can be found only in common law countries: Great Britain, New
Zealand, apd Massachusetts. The reason for this curious fact
may be either that the rule of negligence as the basis of tort lia-
bility is stronger and more inbred in the common than in the civil
law tradition ;19 or that the guaranty of financial solvency is con-
sidered more important in view of the greater number of auto-
mobile owners of modest means in these countries than in Conti-
nental Europe.
It follows from the preceding analysis that only legislation of
the third category solves the problem fully and satisfactorily.
Therefore, I shall be primarily concerned with foreign legislation
which both imposes strict liability and provides for compulsory
insurance,-namely, that of Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden,
Austria, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia.
The list of these seven countries which have gone the full
length of the path of legislative reform is in itself illuminating.
The first four are Scandinavian countries, all of which are com-
monly regarded as leaders in progressive social legislation. The
three Central European countries are also generally known to
recognize the needs of modern mechanized society and to have
striven to meet them by legislation which has proved to be more
or less adequate. The great powers-and some of them claim to
be the standard-bearers of civilization and of progress-are con-
spicuous by their absence.2 0
19Yet, the negligence rule is a much more serious handicap in common
law countries where these cases are tried with a jury than in civil law
countries where juries in civil suits have been long abolished.2oWhat legislation France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Soviet
Russia have on this subject, does not go even so far as the half-way measures
enacted by Germany, Great Britain and New Zealand. None of these coun-
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The content of these statutes will now be surveyed as they
relate, first, to the question of legal liability and, second, to the
problem of financial responsibility. They are by no means uni-
form; on the contrary, they show considerable differences in detail
which correspond to differences in legal tradition and in national
temperament.2' Yet, they are based on certain fundamental
principles common to all; and my purpose is to examine these
common foundations rather than to analyze divergences of minor
importance or of a merely technical nature.
I. LEGAL LIABILITY.
The statutes of Austria, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark,
Switzerland and Czechoslovakia-and also of Germany-impose
liability irrespective of fault or negligence for injuries or damages
resulting from the use2 2 or operation 23 of motor-vehicles on the
public highways. This liability is imposed primarily on the owner24
or the lawful possessor (Halter, d6tenteur)22 of the car and as a
tries requires compulsory insurance except by public-service vehicles. As far
as legal liability is concerned, if special legislation exists at all, the victim
has at best a prima facie case, the automobilist's negligence being presumed.
It should, however, be pointed out that in some of these countries the un-
responsiveness of the legislature has induced the courts to come to the aid of
the victim. The most conspicuous and interesting example is the judicial
law-making in France whereby, in the case of automobile accidents, the
courts have re-interpreted the presumption of fault contained in art. 1384,
sec. 1 of the Civil Code to mean a presumption of liability rebuttable only
by proof of an act of God or of the fault of a third party. See as to this
judge-made law reform, Deik, Automobile Accidents; A Comparative Study
of the Law of Liability in Europe, (1931) 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 305.2
'The League of Nations Institute for the Unification of Private Law at
Rome is engaged in a study of this subject with a view to the preparation
of a uniform statute. In connection with this study the Institute has com-
piled a great deal of statutory and informational materials. See: S. D. N.-
V. D. P. 1935.-tudes XVIII. Responsabilit6 civile des automobilist. Doc.
No. I. (April, 1935): -tude pr6liminaire; Doc. No. II (May, 1935):
Documents communiques par l'Association internationale des Automobile-
Clubs reconnus. (Both mimeographed). The author wishes to make un-
reserved acknowledgment to this useful compilation of materials which
rendered accessible to him statutes written in languages intelligible only to
the chosen few.
2 2Austrian statute of 1908, supra note 9, sec. 1; Norwegian statute of
1926, supra note 10, sec. 30; Danish statute, supra note 13, sec. 38, par. 1;
Swiss statute, supra note 14, art. 37; Czechoslovak statute, supra note
15, sec. 45, par. 1; German statute, supra note 6, sec. 7.
2 3Swedish statute of 1916, supra note 11, sec. 2; Finnish statute, supra
note 12, sec. 2.
24 Austrian statute of 1908, sec. 1; Swedish statute of 1916, sec. 2; Fin-
nish statute, sec. 2; Norwegian statute, sec. 31; Czechoslovak statute, sec.
45, par. 1.
2 5Danish statute, sec. 38, par. 1; Swiss statute, art. 37; German statute,
sec. 7. The Swiss statute expressly stipulates in art. 47 that this strict lia-
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rule covers injury to person and property not transported in the
vehicle.26 The owner or the lawful possessor may be exonerated
fully of this strict liability by proving that the accident was caused
by: (a) the exclusive negligence of the victim or of a third party ;27
(b) an act of God (force majeur) or an "inevitable event" exclu-
sive of defect in the car ;28 (c) the unauthorized use of the car
provided such use was not made possible by the owner's negli-
gence.2 9  Partial exoneration (i.e. mitigation of the amount of
damages) is provided for in case of contributory negligence of the
victim or of a third party.' 0 In case the injury is caused by the
collision of two or more cars, the owners or possessors are jointly
liable to third parties and the daiages to be borne by each are
apportioned by the court on the basis of their respective fault.31
bility is imposed also on the federal government as a "possessor" of motor-
vehicles.
The civil law concept of Halter or d~tenteur designates the person who
has actually the right of control or disposition over an object. This person
is, of course, not necessarily the owner.2 6Austrian statute of 1908, sec. 4; German statute, sec. 8; Swedish
statute of 1916, sec. 2; Finnish statute, sec. 2; Danish statute, sec. 38, par.
2. The Norwegian statute, sec. 30, and the Czechoslovak statute, sec. 49
impose strict liability with respect to persons or goods in the car unless they
are gratuitously transported. The Swiss statute goes even further: art. 37
extends the liability also to gratuitous transportees and merely gives power
to the court to reduce the damages if the accident was not caused by any
fault of the possessor.2 7Austrian statute of 1908, sec. 2; German statute, sec. 7; Czechoslovak
statute, sec. 47, par. 1. The Swiss statute, art. 37, requires for full exonera-
tion that the victim's exclusive fault should be gross negligence; while the
Norwegian statute, sec. 30, and the Danish statute, sec. 38, par. 1, permit
full exoneration if the victim's exclusive fault consisted of either a deliberate
act or gross negligence. Several of the statutes specify that employees of
the owner or persons concerned with the operation of the car cannot be con-
sidered "third parties."2 8German statute, sec 7; Danish statute, sec. 38, par. 1; Swedish statute
of 1916, sec. 2; Swiss statute, art. 37. The Austrian statute of 1908, sec. 2;
the Finnish statute, sec. 2; and the Czechoslovak statute, sec. 47, par. 1
qualify the "inevitability" of an event as a cause of exoneration by re-
quiring proof of due diligence on the part of the driver.2 9Austrian statute of 1908, sec. 1; German statute, sec. 7; Swedish
statute of 1916, sec. 6; Finnish statute, sec. 7; Norwegian statute, sec.
31; Swiss statute, art. 37; Czechoslovak statute, sec. 45.3OAustrian statute of 1908, sec. 2; German statute, sec. 9; Norwegian
statute, sec. 30; Danish statute, sec. 38, par. 1; Czechoslovak statute, sec.
47, par. 3. The Swedish statute of 1916, sec. 2, and the Finnish statute, sec.
5, give power to the court to exonerate the owner fully or partly from lia-
bility, depending upon the degree of the contributory negligence. The Swiss
statute, art. 37, permits only partial exoneration in case of slight con-
tributory negligence. As the liability also extends to gratuitous transportees
(supra note 26), the court may, in its discretion, regard the contributory
negligence of such gratuitous transportees as a ground of total or partial
exoneration.3 1Austrian statute of 1908, sec. 3; German statute, see. 17; Swedish
statute of 1916, sec. 5; Finnish statute, sec. 6; Danish statute, sec. 38, pars.
4, 7; Swiss statute, art. 38; Czechoslovak statute, sec. 48.
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Liability for injury or damage inflicted on each other by colliding
cars is, as a rule, determined by the general principles of tort law
(the comparative negligence rule) .32
It is noteworthy that except in Germany and Finland, the
imposition of strict liability was not accompanied by a limitation
of the amount of damages recoverable ;33 the determination of this
amount is left to the general tort law.3 4  In this connection some
interesting provisions of the Finnish and the Swiss statutes deserve
mention. The Finnish statute provides, in sec. 12, for modifica-
tion of the amount of damages payable in the form of annuities
if circumstances warrant. The Swiss statute empowers the court,
in case the victim has an exceptionally high income, to reduce
equitably the amount of damages. (Art. 41) On the other hand,
in case of gross negligence the court may impose punitive damages
in addition to compensation. (Art. 42.)
The imposition of liability irrespective of fault and the con-
sequent reversal of the burden of proof constituted in all these
countries a departure from the general principles of tort-law;
for, in the civil law as in the common law, liability is generally
predicated upon the affirmative proof of negligence.33 As has
been indicated above strict liability is predicated upon risk-i.e. the
risk created by the use or operation of the automobile.3 6 The
question may be raised whether there is any justification for
singling out the owners or users of automobiles and holding them
32Austrian statute of 1908, sec. 3; German statute, sec. 17; Swedish
statute of 1916, sec. 5; Finnish statute, sec. 6; Norwegian statute, sec. 30.
The Swiss statute, art. 39, goes so far as to apply the strict liability even
to personal injuries (not property damage) inflicted upon persons in
the colliding cars.
3 3The German statute limits, in sec. 12, the maximum compensation
for personal injury or death to 25,000 Goldmarks capital or an annuity
of 1,500 Goldmarks per victim or 75,000 Goldmarks capital or an annuity
of 4,500 Goldmarks per accident. Property damage may not exceed 5,000
Goldmarks. The Finnish statute limits, in sec. 10, the maximum compensa-
tion for personal injury or death to an annuity of 4,000 Marks per person
and of 12,000 'Marks per accident (this annuity may, at the court's discretion,
be paid in a corresponding capital) and for property damage to 25,000 Marks.
34 Austrian statute of 1908, sec. 3; Swedish statute of 1916, sec. 8; Nor-
wegian statute, sec. 32; Swiss statute, art. 41; Czechoslovak statute, sec.
46. The absence of such a limitation is not of practical consequence in
countries requiring compulsory insurance, since the minimum coverage is
generally determined in the light of average awards.
3
rSee e.g. French, Civil Code, arts. 1382, 1383; German, Civil Code,
see. 823; Austrian, Civil Code, secs. 1294, 1295; Swiss Code of Obligations,
art. 41; Spain, Civil Code, art. 1902; Italian, Civil Code, art. 1151.
31,See supra, p. 129, and notes 22 and 23. The Swedish statute of 1916,
see. 2, and the Finnish statute, sec. 2, base liability, in addition to risk, on the
driver's presumed negligence.
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to such a strict accountability. When the German Government
proposed, in 1906, to impose a stringent liability for automobile
accidents, the report accompanying the bill which ultimately be-
came the statute of 190937 sought to justify the departure from the
negligence rule of the "common law" as follows:
"While prior to the enactment of the Civil Code [1896] auto-
mobile traffic on the public highway was infrequent, such traffic
has considerably increased recently in Germany. However grati
fying the development of this promising means of communica-
tion and of the industry connected with it may be, it is accom-
panied by a substantial increase of accidents caused by automobiles.
The civil law in force [sec. 823 of the Civil Code] proved to be
inadequate to protect against and to secure compensation for such
accidents .... The proof of negligence in case of injuries caused
by automobiles is often particularly difficult. The speed with
which the accident occurs, the excitement of the injured party in
the moment of the accident as well as the fact that besides the
participants no witnesses are present, make it often impossible to
determine the exact circumstances in such a way as necessary to
support a claim according to the law now in force .... The law
now in force is utterly ineffective in cases wherein the accident
is caused by no negligence whatever but by the dangers inherent
in automobile traffic.
"The imposition of a more stringent liability seems to be in
the interest of the safety of traffic. It is also equitable that the
person engaged in an enterprise which has inherent dangers shall
be held liable for damages resulting from such enterprise irrespec-
tive of any negligence of his own .... The dangers of automobile
traffic result from the fact that motor-vehicles are capable and are
indeed intended to develop extraordinary speed. . . . Apart from
this it may be hoped that a more stringent liability will result in
greater care and, consequently, in a decrease in the number of
accidents.1
3 8
Somewhat analogous reasoning was given by the Swiss govern-
ment in support of various bills submitted by it in the course of
the past fifteen years aiming at the same objective. The enactment
of the Swiss statute of 1932'9 marked the end of a sustained
struggle for this legislative reform in face of an opposition by a
people devoted like the American people, to "rugged individualism"
and, perhaps, even more conservative. The history of this strug-
gle is of sufficient interest to justify a brief digression.
American lawyers will be particularly interested to know that
37Supra note 6.
3sQuoted in Miller, Automobilgesetz [Stilke's Recbtsbibliothek, No. 44]
(5th ed., 1929), 199-200.
39Supra note 14.
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federal legislation in this matter was first impossible on account
of constitutional limitations. 40 The Swiss federal constitution is,
like our own, one of delegated powers, the cantons (corresponding
to our states) having retained all powers not expressly delegated
to the federal government. A motion to amend the constitution
enabling the federal government to legislate on automobile traffic
and liability for accidents caused by motor-vehicles was made as
early as 1908. After considerable wrangle between the Bundesrat
and the Stfnderat-the legislative organs of the Swiss Parliament
-as to the necessity and wording, such an amendment was finally
adopted by referendum on May 22, 1921. 41 The amendment, in-
corporated as Art. 37b of the constitution, reads:
"The Confederation has power to legislate concerning motor
vehicles and cycles. .. "
Following the amendment of the constitution, the federal Depart-
ment of Justice submitted a bill in 1922 which was extensively
discussed by the legislature and experts for three years and finally
enacted on February 10, 1926,42 but which was rejected on May
15, 1927, by a referendum held upon request under the constitu-
tion.43 Undaunted by the hostility manifested against strict lia-
bility and compulsory insurance and encouraged by wide and, on
the whole, sympathetic discussion in juristic circles,44 the govern-
ment proceeded to prepare another bill. After an expert commis-
sion had favorably passed upon the bill prepared by the Depart-
ment of Justice,4 '5 the government introduced it in the legislature
and after slight modifications it became the statute of March 15,
1932.
The annotation to the bill which was thus enacted contains the
40A bill prepared by the Department of Justice imposing strict lia-
bility on automobile owners was rejected by the Bundesrat in 1910 on the
ground of lack of constitutional authority.
41Bundesblatt 1921, III, 657; Eidgenbssische Gesetzessammlung 1921,739.
42 The bill when introduced in Parliament was accompanied by a mes-
sage setting forth in detail the reasons which induced the government to
propose this legislation. The careful study of this document (Message du
Conseil fd6ral ;! 'Assembl~e f~d6rale, Doc. No. 1672, November 3, 1922)
is recommended to every serious student of this problem.
43Bundesblatt, 1927, 1, 752.
44Liability for automobile accidents was the chief topic at the meeting
of the Swiss Lawyers' Association in September, 1930. See the compre-
hensive reports of two prominent Swiss lawyers: Dr. A. Homberger, Haft-
pflicht ohne Verschulden, and Professor Max Petitpierre, La responsabilit6
causale, in Verbandlungen des Schweizerischen Juristenvereins, 1930, Heft 1.
45See the instructive annotations to the bill in Avant projet issued on
September 15, 1930.
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following summary of facts justifying the imposition of strict
liability:
"For a considerable time, the tightening of rules of liability of
automobile owners has been urged. This is the reason why the
practice of our courts-as is the case in other countries as well-
and especially that of the federal Supreme Court (which is most
important in this connection), approaches so closely the principle
of causal liability. Through this evolution, which was by no means
accidental, the Court has shown the legislature the direction which
ought to be followed. Whether or not consciously, the reasons are
the same as they were in case of liability for industrial and railroad
accidents. There, the development of industry, here the develop-
ment of traffic have created new dangers. Statistics have shown
that economic progress is bought by human life and health, without
its being always possible to establish tangible fault on the part
of individuals. Should this increase of risk created by traffic be
supported by the injured party alone? No. The person who first
should assume part of this burden is certainly he who caused the
increase of the risk: the automobile owner.
46
It is to be noted from the above quotation that the imposition
of strict liability in Switzerland was not as revolutionary a reform
as the opposition to it would seem to indicate. The decisions of
the Swiss courts and, particularly, those of the federal Supreme
Court had in fact accomplished the same result by accepting, on
the one hand, almost any proof as evidence of negligence, and,
by raising, on the other hand, the standard of "due care" so high
that it was tantamount to imposing absolute liability.47 The
statute did indeed little more than codify in perhaps somewhat more
precise terms and give legislative sanction to case-law.48
The American lawyer or legislator may, however, not be im-
pressed by changes brought about in civil law countries. In our
insularity of thinking and outlook, we are prone to disregard
46Similar reasoning has been set forth in the message of November 3,
1922, accompanying the first bill. See the document cited supra note 42,
esp. pp. 15 ff.47The study of Swiss case-law in this field would be another illuminating
illustration of judicial legislation in a code-country,-perhaps even more in-
teresting than the study made by the author in a similar evolution in French
law, cited supra note 20.48Despite its comparatively short existence, the literature of the Swiss
statute is already respectable both in quality and quantity. The more im-
portant books and studies are the following: Dr. J. Strebel, Kommentar
zum Bundesgesetz fiber den Motorzeug-und Fahrradverkehr (Zuirich 1934-
36); Dr. Emil Heuberger, Der Tier-, Automobil-und Flugzeughalter im
schweizerischen Haftpflichtrecht, [Abhandlungen zum schweizerischen Recht,
(N.F.) No. 101]. (Bern, 1935) 26-85; Schfrer, "Die neue Automobilhaft-
pflicht," (1933) 69 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 305; Kindler,
"Die Haft-und Versicherungspflicht des Automobilhalters" (1933) 52
(N.S.) Zeitschrift ffir schweizerisches Recbt 125.
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entirely or, at least, to view with suspicion any legal system not
akin to our own. Also, we are still somewhat disdainful of statute
law and inclined to consider legislation as mere restatement of
judge-made law and, therefore, as inferior to case law. For this
reason, it is of special interest to call attention to an endeavor
recently initiated in Great Britain to change by legislation the
common law rule of negligence in the case of automobile accidents.
In England, whence we inherited the common law tradition, the
inadequacy of the negligence rule in such cases has been felt the
same way and for the same reasons as in the continental civil law
countries. Following the enactment of the British Road Traffic
Act of 1930 which, as has been indicated, provided for com-
pulsory insurance,"' a bill was introduced in the House of Lords
proposing, in substance, the abolition of the negligence rule in
automobile accident cases and substituting for the contributory
negligence rule, which completely bars recovery, the comparative
negligence rule which-as in the civil law countries-would go
merely to the mitigation of damages. The debate which took place
upon the second reading of the bill is very illuminating; indeed, it
should be made compulsory reading in every legislature, law
school and bar association in this country.50 After the bill was
amended by a select committee, it was passed by the House of
Lords in May, 1934, as the Road Traffic (Compensation for Ac-
cidents) Bill and referred to the Commons where it now rests.51
Although, according to information given to the writer, there is
little chance of this bill being passed by the Commons and thus
becoming the law of the realm in the immediate future, a beginning
at least has been made by focussing attention on the inadequacy
49Supra, p. 126.50Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, (House of Lords), Vol. 84, pp.
543 ff. See especially the motivation of the bill by the proponent (Lord
Danesfort) and the comments of the Lord Chancellor (Viscount Sankey).
,Hansard, op. cit. supra note 50, Vol. 93, pp. 144 ff. The bill,
as passed by the Lords, provides in Sec. 1:
"Where bodily injury to a person is caused by or arises out of the use
of a motor vehicle on a road or in a place to which the public have a
right of access damages shall be recoverable from the owner of the motor
vehicle thereof without proof of negligence or intention or other cause of
action as though the injury had been caused by his wilful act, neglect or
default, except where the injury was solely due to the negligence of the in-jured person:
"Provided that-
"(a) where the injury was contributed to but not solely due to the neg-
ligence of the injured person there shall be taken into account in computing
the damages the degree in which the negligence of such person contributed
to the accident; . .. "
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of the common law. If they did nothing more, the extensive
debates in the House of Lords made it clear that there is need for
legislative reform. it is to be hoped that some of our state legisla-
tures will soon give earnest attention to the desirability of legisla-
tion imposing strict liability for automobile accidents along the
lines of the statutes in force in several European countries or the
legislative proposal pending in Great Britain.
II. FINANCIAL REsPONSIBILITY52
In addition to imposing strict liability on the owners or pos-
sessors of automobiles, the legislation of Austria, Norway, Sweden,
Finland, Denmark, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia also seeks to
guarantee their solvency by requiring them, as a condition of
obtaining a license to use a car, to carry insurance.53 As has been
indicated above the legislation of Great Britain and of New Zealand
also requires insurance without, however, changing the common
law liability 4 By some of these statutes the deposit of security is
permitted in lieu of insurance."" The duty to insure or to put up
security is imposed upon the owner of the car in every country
with the exception of Switzerland, where it is imposed upon the
52 For an exhaustive analysis of this problem see a series of articles
published in the October, 1936, issue of Law and Contemporary Problems
(Vol. 3, No. 4) under the title "Financial Protection for the Motor Accident
Victim." The author wishes to acknowledge the courtesy of Professor
David F. Cavers, Editor of Law and Contemporary Problems for his
courteous permission to use here parts of the author's article on the British
Road Traffic Acts published in that symposium.
53Austrian statute of 1929, supra note 9, sec. 2, par. V; Norwegian
statute of 1926, supra note 10, sec. 11; Swedish statute of 1929, supra note
11, sec. 1; Finnish statute, supra note 12, sec. 13; Danish statute, supra
note 13, sec. 39, par. 1; Swiss statute, supra note 14, art. 48; Czechoslovak
statute, supra note 15, sec. 56.
For an excellent study of the compulsory insurance problem from the
continental lawyer's point of view see Dr. Bernhard Peyer, Die Haftpflich-
versicherung des Motorzeughalters, (Aaran, 1935) [Ziircher Beitrage zur
Rechtswissenschaft (N.F.) No. 40].
54British Road Traffic Act 1930, supra note 8, sec. 35; New Zealand
Act 1928, supra note 7, sec. 3 par. 1. See the author's study Compulsory
Liability Insurance Under the British Road Traffic Acts of 1930 and 1934,
(1936) 3 Law and Contemporary Problems 565.
5 5Norwegian statute, sec. 11; Czechoslovak statute, sec. 56; British
statute, sec. 35. The British statute requires the deposit of £15,000 in cash;
the Norwegian statute, (sec. 11) requires a security consisting of cash,
bankbook, bonds or negotiable securities to the full amount of the mini-
mum amounts for which the car-owner's liability must be covered; the
Czechoslovak Executive Order issued in pursuance of the statute (supra
note 15) provides (sec. 120) that security may consist of cash, bonds, bank
deposit books, etc., and may be 10 per cent less than the minimum amounts
which the insurance must cover.
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possessor."" Most of the statutes exempt from the duty to insure,
the government and other public authorities and foreign diplomats
and consuls. 5 7 The insurance must be obtained from an insurance
company approved or authorized by the state to engage in this
business ;5s the approval usually being subject to compliance with
certain conditions either specified in the statute itself59 or con-
tained in the general insurance law.60 With the exception-of the
Finnish statute and the British Act of 1930, every statute or ar
executive order issued in pursuance thereof, determines the mini-
mum sums which the insurance must cover, these minima being
severally stated with respect to injury to, or the death of, one
person, or injuries to, or the death of, several persons caused b)
the same accident, and to property damage."' This limitation or
'
0 Swiss statute, art. 49.
57 The exemptions in the various legislations are as follows: Finnish
statute, sec. 13: The head of the state, the government and municipalities,
heads of foreign states and members of ruling houses; Norwegian statute, sec.
11: the government and municipalities; Danish statute, sec. 39, par. 3 and
the Swedish statute of 1929, sec. 4: The King, members of the royal family,
heads of foreign states and members of foreign ruling houses, the govern-
ment, municipalities, and public institutions; Austrian statute of 1929, sec.
2, par. V: federal, state and county governments and municipalities with
more than 20,000 population; Swiss statute, art. 48: federal and cantonal
governments; Czechoslovak statute, sec. 57: the government and autonomous
county and municipal authorities. With the exception of the Swiss statute,
foreign diplomats and foreign consuls (provided they are not nationals of
the local sovereign) are also exempt from the duty to insure; but the
Norwegian statute limits this exemption to the heads of foreign missions,
while the Czechoslovak statute conditions such exemption upon reciprocity.
On the other hand, the New Zealand Act, sec. 18 provides that the Crown,
in its capacity of car-owner, is also subject to the duty to insure.
58Finnish statute, sec. 13; Danish statute, sec. 39, par. 1; Swedish stat-
ute of 1929, sec. 6; Austrian statute of 1929, sec. 2, par. V; Swiss statute,
art. 53; Czechoslovak statute, sec. 56.
r0E.g. New Zealand Act, sec. 4, requiring every insurance company will-
ing to insure such policies as prescribed by the Act, so to notify the
Registrar of Motor Vehicles; Finnish Executive Order issued in pursuance
of the statute supra note 12, sec. 3, requiring the type of insurance com-
panies designated in sec. 2 to notify the Ministry of Social Questions of
their intention to issue policies under the statute; British Act 1930, sec. 36,
par. 3 defining "authorized insurer" as an underwriter complying with the
Assurance Companies Act 1909 as amended by sec. 39 of the present Act.
C0E.g. Swiss statute, art. 53.
6 1Norwegian statute of 1926, sec. 11: 10,000 Norwegian crowns per
victim, 20,000 crowns per accident, 5,000 crowns for property damage;
Swedish statute of 1929, sec. 11: 20,000 Swedish crowns per person, 60,000
crowns per accident, 10,000 crowns for property damage; Austrian Execu-
tive order issued in pursuance of the 1929 statute, supra note 9, sec. 47:
10,000 shillings per person, 40,000 shillings per accident, 2,000 shillings for
property damage; Swiss statute, art. 52: 50,000 Swiss francs per victim,
100,000 francs per accident, 5,000 francs for property damage. The Czecho-
slovak statute, sec. 56, empowered the government to determine the minima
to be covered by insurance not to exceed 100,000 Czech crowns per person,
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the amount which must be covered by insurance is obviously in-
tended to lighten the burden which the statutory duty to insure im-
poses on the automobile owner, by permitting the underwriter
to calculate premiums on the basis of definite risks. It may be
noted parenthetically that the minimum amounts required by the
various statutes, while not necessarily adequate in all instances,
to satisfy justifiable claims for compensation, are nevertheless
large enough to take care of the most pressing needs of an injured
party. The certainty that the victim's claim will be satisfied to
some extent at least is doubtless a great improvement over the
uncertainty of any satisfaction from the uninsured defendant and
should outweigh any dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of the
insurance required.
A further-though perhaps not very significant-provision
contained in several statutes, intended to lighten the car-owner's
burden of insuring, exempts the claims of certain categories of
persons from the coverage. Thus, in Sweden the insurance need
not cover the owner or the driver ;62 in Switzerland, claims of the
possessor's family, including ascendants and descendants, need not
be covered by the insurance.6 3 With the same end in view, some-
times the insured's liability within certain limits is not covered by
the insurance."4
As the primary objective of the compulsory insurance is to
secure compensation for the victim,65 the statutes contain pro-
350,000 crowns per accident and 50,000 crowns for property damage; the
Executive Order issued in pursuance of the statute, supra note 15 sets,
in sec. 119, the following sums: 50,000 crowns per person, 200,000 crowns
per accident, 10,000 crowns for property damage. The New Zealand Act, sec.
6, par. 2 limits the insurer's liability to £20,000 for all claims of passengers,
but otherwise does not limit liability. Several of the statutes specify, in addi-
tion to the above stated sums applicable to passenger cars, smaller and
larger minima, respectively, for motor-cycles on one hand and for public-
service vehicles and buses on the other hand.
It may be noted that the Finnish statute by limiting the recoverable
amounts (supra note 33) in effect determined, without specific provision,
the amounts which must be covered by the policy. See Finnish Executive
Order supra note 12, sec. 8.
02Swedish statute of 1929, sec. 17.
G
3Swiss statute, art 48.
64E. g., Czechoslovak statute, sec. 59, and Executive Order, sec. 121,
providing that the insured himself must pay damages up to 400 Czech crowns
and, in case of more serious accidents, 10% of the damages not to exceed
20,000 crowns.65See annotation to Art. 41 of the Swiss bill submitted by the Federal
Dept. of Justice in 1930 supra, note 45 (this became art. 48 of the statute) :
"The primary purpose of [compulsory liability insurance] is to guarantee the
satisfaction of the victim's claims, and not to cover the insured." Cf. also
the remarks of the Minister of Transport (Mr. Herbert Morrison) in the
AUTOMOBILE COMPENSATION
visions calculated either to facilitate the enforcement, or to pre-
clude the defeat, of the victim's claim. Thus in some statutes the
victim is given a right of direct action against the insurer;66 in
others breach of conditions by the insured is denied any effect on
the victim's claim or its effect is limited- - 7 without, however,
affecting the insurer's right of recourse against the policy-holder
in case of such breach.P8 In this category also belong provisions
aiming to maintain the insurer's duty intact irrespective of transfer
of ownership.""
debate during the second reading of the British Road Traffic Bill on Febru-
ary 18, 1930, 235 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, (Commons) 5th Ser.,
p. 1203.6 6Norwegian statute, sec. 11; Swedish statute, sec. 23; Swiss statute,
art. 49. Under the Finnish Executive Order issued in pursuance of the
statute, sec. 10, the insurer remains liable to the victim even if payment
was made to the insured but the victim received no compensation. The ab-
sence of such a provision in several of the automobile statutes here considered
does not mean of course that the victim has no direct recourse; this proce-
dure may be available to him under the general insurance law. Thus, in Great
Britain, the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930, 20 & 21
Geo. V, ch. 25, enacted shortly before the passage of the Road Traffic Act
gave the victim a right of direct action against the insurers but only in case
of the insured's insolvency. (sec. 1, par. (1). As to the right of direct
action against the insurer from the continental lawyer's point of view see
the study of Dr. Walter Cassani, Das direkte Forderungsrecht des Gerschii-
digten gegen den Versicherer des Automobilhalters, (Bern, 1935) [Abhand-
lungen zum schweizerischen Recht, (N.F.) No. 105].617The Finnish Executive Order, sec. 8, and the Swiss statute, Art. 50,
deny any effect to a breach of conditions by the insured upon the victim's
claim; under the Swedish statute of 1929, secs. 18, 19, even a policy ob-
tained by fraud or misrepresentation remains enforceable by the victim
against the insurer. The British Act of 1930, sec. 38 provided that the
claims of third parties shall not be affected by the breach of any condition
in a policy which relates to something which the policy requires to be done
or omitted to be done after the accident. This provision still permitted the
insurer to repudiate liability for breach of conditions prior to the accident-
a loophole sufficiently broad to escape payment frequently, and necessitating
an amendement to narrow this loophole. Sec. 10 of the Road Traffic Act
of 1934 imposes on the insurer the duty to pay the victim even if he would
be entitled to avoid or cancel the policy as against the insured. Moreover,
the avoidance on the ground of misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a ma-
terial fact, recognized by the common law, is made more burdensome by
placing upon the insurer the burden of bringing, under this Act, a separate
action for a declaratory judgment rather than permitting him, as theretofore,
to raise such issues as a defense in an action on the contract.
',-Of course, the insurer may have recourse against the policy holder
for reasons other than breach of conditions. Thus, for instance, the Danish
statute gives a right of recourse if the accident was caused by the insured
owner's gross negligence or deliberate act (sec. 39, par. 7). It is interesting
to note that the Danish statute as amended in 1932, provides that the owner
may not insure against this right of recourse in case of gross negligence
(sec. 39, par. 8). Several of the statutes also give the insurer a right of
recourse against the person who caused the accident; see e. g. the Finnish
statute, sec. 17.6G1E. g. Finnish Executive Order, sec. 9, providing that the policy re-
mains effective irrespective of change of ownership: Swiss statute, art 48,
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The most important problem in this connection arises with
respect to injuries caused by unidentified automobiles (hit-and-
run cases) or by cars whose owners escape the vigilance of the
law and operate their cars without having taken out an insurance
policy.70 Only four of the statutes have made provision for com-
pensation in such cases. The Swedish statute of 1929 provides,
in sec. 21, that where the owner of a car causing injury or damage
cannot be identified, the insurance companies issuing this kind of
insurance are jointly liable to indemnify the victim. The Swiss
statute, in Art. 55, directed the federal government to conclude
a contract with insurance companies for the payment of personal
injury claims caused by the use of a car by an unauthorized per-
son (when such use is made without fault on the possessor's part).
The premium of this special insurance is defrayed by the govern-
ment from duty on gasoline."' The Czechoslovak statute provides,
in sec. 64, for the establishment of a fund for the payment of dam-
ages for personal injuries caused by unidentified cars. This fund
is to be supported, partly, by fines to be paid by owners not com-
plying with the insurance requirement (sec. 62) and, partly, by
the yearly contribution of insurance companies consisting of 1
per cent of their net income from premiums (sec. 65). Finally,
on October 27, 1931, in New Zealand, the Minister of Transport
concluded an agreement with the insurance companies which-
like the Swiss agreement-provides for the settlement of claims
for personal injuries caused by unidentified automobiles.7 2
While there is undoubtedly a great deal of difference between
the law in books and the law in action, the belief seems to be
justified that the requirement of compulsory insurance has not
produced the undesirable results which its opponents in this and
in other countries have habitually prophesied.
providing that when the car changes hands, right and duties under the
policy pass to the new possessor.
70The enforcement of the insurance obligation is usually accomplished
by conditioning the issue of license to use the car upon the production of a
certificate from the insurance company; see e. g. Finnish Executive Order,
sec. 11; Norwegian statute, sec. 11; Swedish statute of 1929, sec. 24; Aus-
trian Executive Order, sec. 49; New Zealand Act, sec. 5, par. 2. In addi-
tion, the violation of the obligation to insure usually entails the penalty of
fine and imprisonment; see e. g. Finnish Executive Order, sec. 12; Czecho-
slovak statute, secs. 62, 80.
TIThis contract was concluded on December 31, 1932. Bundesblatt,
January 11, 1933. Persons transported in the car cannot claim damages
from the insurer if they knew that the use of the car was unauthorized.
72New Zealand Gazette, 1931, 3023.
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It is important to note, first, that no one of the countries which
have adopted the compulsory insurance idea has deemed it neces-
sary to take this insurance out of the hands of private business
and administer it through a state insurance fund. This does not
imply any preference for or against state insurance; it indicates,
however, the error of those who assert that universal compulsory
insurance can be carried out only by the state. In every country
where compulsory insurance is in force, private companies have
found it possible to assume the risks and make profits (otherwise
they would not have remained in business) although the govern-
ment has, under some of the statutes, the power to control or de-
termine premium rates73 and although the insurer is, under some
of the statutes, denied the right to refuse to issue a policy.
7 4
Second, it does not seem that the burden imposed on the owners
or users of automobiles through the insurance requirement has
been so heavy as to affect the automobile industry adversely. On
the contrary, information received from Switzerland, Austria,
Norway, Sweden and Great Britain is to the effect that the number
of automobiles has steadily increased despite the introduction of
compulsory insurance. The amount paid out for premiums is not
great in proportion to the total expenditure involved in the acquisi-
tion and the upkeep of a car. It may be urged that this question
should be viewed from a different angle in the United States since
the relative cheapness of automobiles in general and of the second-
hand cars in particular, widens considerably the margin between
the cost of owning and operating a car with insurance and with-
out it; hence the requirement of insurance may be too onerous
for a great many people who cannot afford to add premium pay-
ments to the operating expenses. It is submitted however, that
the inconvenience of those who could not afford a car if they were
required to carry liability insurance would be found to be sub-
stantially less than the hardships suffered by those victims of
automobile accidents who, in the present state of affairs, are faced
with judgment-proof tort-feasors. Certainly their inconvenience
is negligible if balanced against the burden borne by society in
caring for these uncompensated victims in one way or another.
73Swedish statute of 1929, sec. 9; Czechoslovak statute sec. 58, par. 2;
New Zealand Act, sec. 16. No provision for control of premium rates is con-
tained in the Finnish, Norwegian, Danish, Swiss, Austrian and British
statutes. Of course, the government presumably always has means to exert
indirect pressure on private insurance companies.
74Such provision is contained in the Finnish Executive Order sec. 4
and in the Swedish statute of 1929, sec. 6.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Third, it does not seem that compulsory insurance has generat-
ed recklessness-a result often predicted for it on the theory that
a car-owner or user will regard his duty of care discharged by the
payment of premiums for his insurance, and on the belief that
liability insurance is primarily for the benefit of the policy-owner.
It has been pointed out, however, that these statutes seek, above
all, to better the position of the victim. We have seen that how-
ever elaborate the provision for the victim's protection may be,
the insurer's liability to the policy-holder is too limited to create in
the latter the feeling that whatever he does, his liability is covered
by the insurance. In this connection reference may be made to the
provisions above discussed which give the insurer a right of re-
course against the policy-holder in case of breach of conditions, or
of gross negligence, and to those requiring the payment of a cer-
tain amount of the damages by the car-owner without the insurer's
assistance. Account should also be taken of the fact that while
the majority of the statutes require the car-owner to insure against
liability in minimum amounts, they do not limit the extent of
liability. The inclination to recklessness may well be checked by
the fear that the damages awarded may exceed the coverage and
by the knowledge that the excess will have to be paid by the
insured. Information has come to me from several countries that
compulsory insurance has not had any adverse effect on the care
with which automobiles are operated, and the increase of accidents
is uniformly attributed by my informants to the increase of traffic
rather than to increased carelessness.
On the other hand, there can be no question that the victim's
position is infinitely better under the compulsory insurance system,
-- especially when it is accompanied by the imposition of strict
liability. That this improvement of the individual victim's lot is
also beneficial to society is obvious if we consider the appalling
number of such individuals. The question seems to come down
simply to this: if there is a cost to be paid for what is believed
to be progress in a mechanized society and an important part
of that cost consists of human life and health, how can that cost
be best and most fairly distributed? What are the equities which
determine the proportion in which various social groups-those
who create the risk by using a machine; those who innocently or
by inadvertence suffer in consequence of such use; and, finally
those who neither create the risk nor suffer from it, but who
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benefit, directly or indirectly, from industrial development-should
be called upon to defray this cost? The requirement of com-
pulsory insurance and the imposition of a strict liability are at-
tempts to answer this question.
Whether or not they constitute the best answer, it is difficult to
say. Certain it is that at least in some of the countries where this
scheme is in force, interested circles-representatives of the gov-
ernment, of the insurance business and of automobile clubs and
lawyers-concur in the view that the situation has been improved.
Criticism is directed at administrative details rather than at the
fundamental principles. It may be asked to what extent these
criticisms are justified. It may be urged that the objective could
be attained by a different, or by improving the present, device so
as to lighten the car-owner's burden on the one hand and to
further smooth the victim's road to compensation on the other
hand. These questions cannot be answered without a more pene-
trating study of the administration of the statutes surveyed. Such
a study is, of course, far beyond the scope of this article, though
I hope to conduct such an investigation in at least one or two coun-
tries where the compulsory insurance scheme seems to operate
particularly successfully. However, I believe that even this
cursory survey should be sufficient to induce thoughtful students
of law and of social problems to consider whether the time has
not come to revise our own laws relating to liability and com-
pensation for automobile accidents. Perhaps it may be too much
to expect of some of our more conservative state legislatures to
overcome the tradition of laissez faire and to consider proposals
for such a reform. But why could not some of the Middle Western
states which, like Minnesota or Wisconsin, have in the past re-
peatedly assumed leadership in progressive social legislation, take
the lead once more and find a remedy for an admitted social evil?
The initiative in this direction was taken more than a decade ago
by Massachusetts, and the time seems to be ripe for another for-
ward step.
